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Wegmann v. Tramontin,1 a case involving an oral contract, a pre-
scribed debt, and a divorced couple who has been engaged in on-
again, off-again litigation with one another in Louisiana courts for 
more than thirty years, represents a quality example of a court in a 
mixed jurisdiction seamlessly applying both civilian principles, 
namely the obligations articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, and rel-
evant common law authority to solve a legal problem. It shows that 
the civilian tradition remains strong in Louisiana courts, but not to 
the exclusion of common law methodology, and that the two need 
not be thought of as, and indeed cannot practically be, mutually ex-
clusive in a mixed jurisdiction like Louisiana. 
 
                                                                                                             
 ∗   J.D. (May, 2017), Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Univer-
sity. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his guidance 
and assistance throughout the writing of this case note.  
 1. Wegmann v. Tramontin 2015-0561 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/13/16), 186 So. 3d 
236, writ denied, 2016-0276 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d 1209.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
Cynthia Wegmann and Gregory Tramontin2 were married in 
1981 and separated in 1985. During marriage, the couple had 
founded the USAgencies Insurance Company, and stock in that 
company was the primary asset of the community of acquets and 
gains existing between them at the time of their separation. Pursuant 
to a partition agreement reached in 1988,3 Ms. Wegmann received 
$25,000 from Mr. Tramontin in exchange for all rights to her US-
Agencies stock. However, in 1994, she sued to rescind the partition 
agreement based on lesion beyond moiety.4 She alleged that her 
shares of USAgencies stock were worth significantly more, and she 
had transferred her rights to the stock “based on erroneous infor-
mation that [the company] had little or no value.”5 She succeeded 
on this claim at the trial court level, receiving a $1,758,571.64 dam-
ages award in the 19th Judicial District Court in 2004, but the Lou-
isiana First Circuit Court of Appeal overturned the decision, holding 
that her original claim had prescribed.6  
The First Circuit’s 2005 decision in Tramontin v. Tramontin 
seemed to be the final word on the matter as far as Louisiana courts 
were concerned, but on April 18, 2010, the controversy was resur-
rected in the form of an alleged oral contract between Ms. Wegmann 
and Mr. Tramontin purportedly obligating Ms. Wegmann to “will-
ingly support Mr. Tramontin in his pending divorce litigation in East 
                                                                                                             
 2. Readers in Louisiana and the Las Vegas area of Nevada may know Greg-
ory Tramontin as “Greg, the GoAuto Guy,” a recurring character in television 
advertisements for the GoAuto Insurance Company, which Mr. Tramontin 
founded in 2009. See GoAuto Insurance, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=nftho_3FUpI. 
 3. Tramontin v. Tramontin, 2004-2286 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So. 
2d 29, 30. 
 4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2589 (2016). 
 5. Id. at 30-31. In fact, Mr. Tramontin had sold his USAgencies stock in 
1988. In return, he had received twenty-five shares of Liberty Underwriters, a 
successor company, and a contract guaranteeing his employment with Liberty at 
$80,000 per year. However, Liberty proceeded soon thereafter to terminate his 
employment, resulting in litigation whereby Mr. Tramontin was awarded a $2.2 
million judgment and the buyback of his Liberty stock for $200,000.  
 6. Tramontin, 928 So. 2d at 34. 
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Baton Rouge Parish with his then-wife,” in exchange for 
“$3,000,000 to $5,000,000 for her ownership in U.S. Agencies [sic] 
Insurance Co.”7 The contract allegedly promised further that, “The 
first portion of the $3,000,000 would be tendered to [Ms. Wegmann] 
after she sold the house she was living in,” the remainder to be pro-
vided on an “‘as-needed basis.’”8 Evidently, Ms. Wegmann held up 
her end of the bargain, selling her house and supporting Mr. Tra-
montin in his divorce action by attending court hearings and being 
“available to testify truthfully.”9 Mr. Tramontin refused to pay, and 
Ms. Wegmann sued him in the Civil District Court for the Parish of 
Orleans for “breach of contract and fraud.”10 Mr. Tramontin pled 
exceptions of prescription, res judicata, no cause of action, and 
vagueness in response.11 The trial court granted his exception of no 
cause of action, dismissing Ms. Wegmann’s claim with prejudice. 
Ms. Wegmann appealed. 
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Ms. Wegmann 
assigned the following errors: that the District Court’s signed judg-
ment and oral reasons for judgment were inconsistent, that the Dis-
trict Court erred by not finding that she and Mr. Tramontin had per-
fected a valid and enforceable oral contract, and finally that the Dis-
trict Court should have dismissed her case without prejudice had it 
correctly decided that her petition did not state a cause of action.12 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in 
full.13  
Ms. Wegmann’s first assignment of error was held to be without 
merit as the court found no conflict between the trial court’s oral 
                                                                                                             
 7. Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 238. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 239.  
 13. Id. at 238.  
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reasons for judgment and the written judgment.14 Had there been 
one, the conflict would have been disposed of by a jurisprudential 
rule that “where there is a conflict between the judgment and its 
written reasons, the judgment controls . . . [and] the same reasoning 
applies where there is a conflict between a written judgment and oral 
reasons for judgment.”15  
Mr. Tramontin’s exception of no cause of action was found to 
have been properly granted because an oral contract to pay a pre-
scribed debt and a contract for an undeterminable sum are unen-
forceable under Louisiana Civil Code articles 1847 and 1973, and a 
contract to pay a fact witness for testimony is void as against public 
policy.16 The court’s treatment of this assignment of error will be 
discussed in further detail infra.  
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that Ms. Wegmann’s petition 
was properly dismissed with prejudice as amendment would have 
been futile under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934, 
which provides that when, “the grounds of the objection raised 
through the exception cannot be . . . removed . . . the action, claim, 
demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed,” with prejudice.17 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. at 239. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion relates that Ms. Wegmann had 
argued in the trial court that Mr. Tramontin had “contracted based on a ‘moral 
obligation to give her the money,’” to which the trial judge had remarked, “Well, 
if the contract is based upon a moral consideration on the defendant’s part, he’ll 
have to answer to a higher authority than me if he violates that. But for the pur-
poses of the law of the State of Louisiana I have to grant the Exception. It’s pre-
scribed. It’s res judicata.” 
 15. Id. See Arbourgh v. Sweet Basil Bistro, Inc., 98-2218, p. 14 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 5/19/99); 740 So. 2d 186, 192, writ denied, 99-2942 (La. 12/17/99); 751 So. 
2d 883; Slaughter v. Bd. Of Sup’rs of S. Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 2010-1049 
p. 37 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/2/11); 76 So. 3d 438, 459, writ denied, 2011-2110 (La. 
1/13/12); 77 So. 3d 970; see also Hebert v. Hebert; 351 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (La. 
1977).  
 16. Id. at 241.  
 17. Id. See Massiha v. Beahm, 2007-0137 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/07); 966 So. 
2d 87. 
2017] WEGMANN V. TRAMONTIN 277 
 
 
 
III. COMMENTARY 
The Fourth Circuit declined to grant legal enforceability to the 
alleged contract under Louisiana Civil Code articles 1847 and 1973, 
as well as on public policy grounds. 
A. Article 1847 
Article 1847 reads in full, “Parol evidence is inadmissible to es-
tablish either a promise to pay the debt of a third person or a promise 
to pay a debt extinguished by prescription.”18 A brief and seemingly 
straightforward article, the Fourth Circuit explains that it stands for 
the proposition that, “an oral contract to pay a prescribed debt is 
unenforceable.”19 Thus, because Ms. Wegmann asserted in her ini-
tial pleading that the amount of money she bargained for under the 
purported contract represented what she believed she was owed by 
Mr. Tramontin for her shares of USAgencies stock under the 1988 
partition agreement, and that debt was held prescribed by the First 
Circuit in Tramontin v. Tramontin,20 the article thus rendered the 
contract unenforceable and Ms. Wegmann with no cause of action. 
As Revision Comment (e) explains, article 1847 was originally 
article 2278 when the Code was promulgated in 1870. Because it 
has no analog in the Code Napoléon, the article is “no doubt [reflec-
tive] of the influence of the common law Statute of Frauds” on post-
bellum Louisiana.21 Here we have a Code article that reflects the 
creeping influence of the common law of Louisiana’s neighbors not 
only on its jurisprudence, but also on its positive law. Like the com-
mon law Statute of Frauds, the article creates not necessarily a rule 
of law, but instead an evidentiary rule; namely, that a court may not 
                                                                                                             
 18. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1847 (2016).  
 19. Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 240. 
 20. Tramontin, 928 So. 2d at 33. 
 21. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1847, Revision Comment (e) (2016). 
278 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 10 
 
 
 
admit parol evidence to prove the existence of certain classes of con-
tracts, and therefore courts may not imbue such contracts with legal 
enforceability when not evidenced by a writing.  
There is an element of friction between the common law and the 
Civil Code at play in this controversy: the civilian concept of the 
natural or moral obligation to pay a prescribed debt, enumerated in 
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1760 and 1761,22 is significantly 
weakened by the incorporation of the Statute of Frauds into the 
Code. A natural obligation is typically understood as an obligation 
that is created by a moral duty to act,23 but one that nevertheless is 
not legally enforceable in the manner of a conventional or general 
obligation with civil effects (known as a “civil obligation”). The 
Code and Louisiana jurisprudence nevertheless grant enforceability 
to some promises to pay a debt, which represents a natural obliga-
tion, thus turning the natural obligation into a civil one.24 This pro-
cess, created by the provision of article 1761 that states, “A contract 
made for the performance of a natural obligation is onerous,” takes 
place when a debtor’s promise to perform a natural obligation “binds 
him to the creditor by a civil obligation of which the natural one is 
the cause.”25 Even if Mr. Tramontin’s oral promise to pay a pre-
scribed debt to Ms. Wegmann had been sufficient to convert a pre-
viously existing natural obligation into a judicially enforceable civil 
one, Louisiana’s incorporation of the Statute of Frauds into article 
1847 would still operate to make such a civil obligation impossible 
                                                                                                             
 22. “A natural obligation is not enforceable by judicial action. Nevertheless, 
whatever has been freely performed in compliance with a natural obligation may 
not be reclaimed. A contract made for the performance of a natural obligation is 
onerous.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1761 (2016). 
 23. Id. at art. 1762. A debt extinguished by prescription is expressly defined 
as a natural obligation in Civil Code article 1762: “Examples of circumstances 
giving rise to a natural obligation are: (1) When a civil obligation has been extin-
guished by prescription . . . .”  
 24. “If the obligor makes a promise to perform his natural obligation, that 
promise, though informally made, gives the creditor an action to enforce it, but … 
in such a case the obligor thorough his promise turns the natural obligation into a 
civil one.” SAÚL LITVINOFF & RONALD J. SCALISE, JR., 5 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 2.1 (2d. ed., West 2016). 
 25. Id. at § 2.23. 
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to enforce. Such a civil obligation would have been created by oral 
contract, and parol evidence would continue to be inadmissible to 
prove its existence in court. 
Because of the unusual nature of the alleged debt in this case—
an alleged lesionary conveyance in a partition agreement evidenced 
by an actually fairly unrelated damages award in an amount far ex-
ceeding the original value of the stock in controversy—it is hard to 
know exactly how it should have been treated. Indeed, whether the 
amount prayed for by Ms. Wegmann can even properly be called a 
“debt” at all. The First Circuit held in Tramontin v. Tramontin that 
Ms. Wegmann’s lesion claim had prescribed because she had not 
brought it within five years of the execution of the agreement under 
Civil Code article 1413, and refused to find an interruption of pre-
scription for reason of contra non valentem agere nulla currit 
praescriptio (no prescription runs against a person unable to act).26 
The court here disposed of this alleged debt easily by characterizing 
it as a prescribed debt which no debtor can create an enforceable 
oral contract to pay; but if Ms. Wegmann had been allowed to amend 
her pleading to state that the money bargained for under the pur-
ported oral contract was not in fact representative of the amount she 
alleged she was owed for her share of USAgencies stock, this would 
have been perhaps a much more difficult question. Surely one that 
could not have been disposed of by Mr. Tramontin’s exception of 
no cause of action in the trial court.27 
Had Ms. Wegmann been allowed to amend her petition to re-
move the prescription problem, there would have simply existed an 
alleged oral contract for payment in exchange for certain acts. In 
such a case, the admissibility of parol evidence to prove the con-
tract’s validity would be controlled not by article 1847, but instead 
by its sister article, article 1846—formerly article 2277 of the Code 
                                                                                                             
 26. Tramontin, 928 So. 2d at 32. 
 27. Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 240. 
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of 1870, and transferred into the current code keeping its spot di-
rectly before article 2278, now 1847—which states that a contract 
the object of which has a value over $500, “must be proved by at 
least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.”28 Indeed, 
the court tells us that Ms. Wegmann claimed that “witnesses could 
corroborate the details of the contract,” but, “such evidence would 
not be admissible.”29 However, if the alleged oral contract were not 
representative of a promise to pay a prescribed debt, it would neces-
sarily fall under article 1846, and that article would expressly admit 
witness testimony related to the details of the alleged contract. The 
trial court disposed of this issue by granting Mr. Tramontin’s excep-
tion of no cause of action and dismissing Ms. Wegmann’s petition 
with prejudice, reasoning that because Ms. Wegmann had memori-
alized her understanding that the $3 to $5 million bargained for in 
the alleged contract represented her purported share of USAgencies, 
that fact was judicially admitted and could not be contradicted by an 
amended petition.30 Therefore, the trial court reasoned, and the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed, amendment of the petition to cure the defect 
that allowed Mr. Tramontin’s exception of no cause of action to be 
granted would be impossible and as such dismissal with prejudice 
was required under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934.  
B. Article 1973 
The court held that the purported oral contract is also without 
effect under Louisiana Civil Code article 1973, which states, in per-
tinent part, “The quantity of a contractual object may be undeter-
mined, provided it is determinable.”31 The court writes that, “Where 
an obligation is ‘too indeterminate’ to meet the requirements of ar-
ticle 1973, the ‘obligation [is] unenforceable because it is without 
                                                                                                             
 28. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1846 (2016).  
 29. Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 240. 
 30. Id. at 241. 
 31. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1973 (2016). 
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cause.’”32 The court concluded that because the purported contract 
was for an amount of money between $3 and $5 million to be ten-
dered on the sale of Ms. Wegmann’s house, and the remainder to be 
paid on an “as-needed basis,”33 the purported contract failed as to 
cause due to an indeterminable object.  
Cause is defined in the first paragraph of article 1967 as “the 
reason why a party obligates himself,” and is one of the crucial in-
gredients of an enforceable contract without which a valid contract 
cannot exist. Quite notable is that the second paragraph of that arti-
cle is the Code’s definition of and express authorization for courts 
to apply the doctrine of detrimental reliance.34 Detrimental reliance 
is yet another common law principle that has been absorbed into the 
law of Louisiana and memorialized in the Code. Louisiana courts 
have held that “Louisiana law allows a party to recover under the 
doctrine of detrimental reliance even if no formal, valid, or enforce-
able contract existed.”35 Here, the court makes no mention of the 
doctrine of detrimental reliance, as it appears Ms. Wegmann did not 
raise the issue.36 This may have been a missed opportunity as it is 
undisputed that Ms. Wegmann did indeed sell her home in reliance 
upon the purported contract between her and Mr. Tramontin. 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. (citing TAC Amusement Co. v. Henry, 238 So. 2d 393,400 (La. App. 
4th Cir. 1970)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1967, para. 2 (2016):  
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have 
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his 
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery 
may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a 
result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous 
promise made without required formalities is not reasonable. 
 35. Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C., 98-0256 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 
So. 2d 423, 429; State v. Murphy Cormier Gen. Contractors, Inc., 2015-111 (La. 
App. 3 Cir. 6/3/15), 170 So. 3d 370, 380, writ denied, 2015-1297 (La. 9/25/15), 
178 So. 3d 573 (“A formal, written, underlying contract is not necessary to prove 
the existence of a binding contractual agreement where the plaintiff can show a 
promise was made, he relied on the promise, the promise was broken, and as a 
result he suffered loss.”). 
 36. Original brief of Defendant-Appellee, 2015 WL 4727336 (La.App. 4 
Cir.); Reply brief of Cynthia Wegmann, Plaintiff-Appellant, 2015 WL 4880096 
(La.App. 4 Cir.). 
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C. Void as Against Public Policy 
Finally, the court upheld the trial court’s determination that the 
alleged oral contract was a contract to secure live testimony through 
remuneration in excess of an amount fixed by law,37 and therefore 
void as against public policy. This finding is notable, as it is sui gen-
eris in Louisiana jurisprudence, being the first recorded opinion to 
apply this particular public policy consideration, although it has 
been known to the common law for many years.38 The court’s ruling 
seems to have the effect of invalidating all contracts to secure live 
testimony in exchange for an amount of money greater than that set 
by law as against public policy within the jurisdiction of the Fourth 
Circuit. It is an open question, then, whether the remaining Louisi-
ana Courts of Appeal will adopt the rule.39 
 
                                                                                                             
 37. Compensation of witnesses in Louisiana is set by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13:3661 (2016). 
 38. The court relies on three of the iconic volumes of common law doctrine 
to reach its determination: Williston on Contracts: “A bargain to pay one who is 
amenable to process a further sum for attending as a witness is generally invalid,” 
RICHARD A. LORD, 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:6 (4th ed., Lawyers Coop-
erative Publ’g), The Restatement (First) of Contracts: “A bargain to pay one who 
is subject to legal process, a sum for his attendance as a witness in addition to that 
fixed by law is illegal.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 552 (1932), and 
the Corpus Juris Segundum: “When a witness ‘is to be paid more than his or her 
legal fees, or other elements occur which tend to show that his or her evidence 
may be improperly influenced, the contract is against public policy.’” 17A C.J.S. 
CONTRACTS § 304). 
 39. In fact, the Fourth Circuit’s decision seems to go beyond what had previ-
ously been the law regarding payment to witnesses. See Dane S. Ciolino, Can I 
make Any Payments to a Fact Witness?, LOUISIANA LEGAL ETHICS Blog 
(Aug. 8, 2013) https://perma.cc/382K-SNSX; Dane S. Ciolino, a distinguished 
scholar of Louisiana Legal Ethics, has written that, at least regarding attorney dis-
cipline, “the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, relevant statutory law, case 
law, and persuasive authority all indicate that a lawyer should not be subjected to 
discipline for paying a fact witness if: 1. the payment is not motivated by an im-
proper purpose, such as to obtain “inside information,” to obtain false testimony 
or to influence the content of the witness’s testimony; 2. the amount paid merely 
compensates the witness for the reasonable value of the time and expenses actu-
ally incurred by the witness; and, 3. the amount of the payment is not contingent 
on the witness’s testimony.” After Wegmann v. Tramontin, however, agreements 
to remit such formerly permissible payments to witnesses in exchange for their 
availability to testify may be unenforceable within the jurisdiction of the Fourth 
Circuit. 
